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a b s t r a c t
Although very little research in bargaining has addressed how perpetrators should deal
with the aftermath of unfair allocations, it has been proposed that an apology may help
the reconciliation process. Prior research, however, only focused on whether apologies
can reveal positive effects on the reconciliation process but did not focus yet on whether
perpetrators are actually willing to apologize. In this paper we investigate perpetrator’s
willingness to apologize for a trust violation in a bargaining setting. We hypothesized that
perpetrators willingness to apologize would be a function of the extent to which the victim
of the trust violation is willing to forgive. This effect, however, was expected to emerge
only among those perpetrators who are low in dispositional trust. The results from a lab-
oratory study with actual transgressions and actual apologetic behavior supported our pre-
dictions and thus emphasize an instrumental view on apologizing in bargaining situations.
 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Bargaining is a breeding ground for unfair allocations. Due to the highly interdependent nature of bargaining situations,
there is a conﬂict between self-interest and the bargaining partner’s interest (Komorita & Parks, 1995). One important guide
that people use to balance the conﬂicting interests in these types of bargaining situations is the equality norm. This norm
beholds that all bargaining parties receive an equal share of the commodity that is to be divided (Van Dijk & De Cremer,
2006). This fairness rule implies that people do not only care about their own outcomes in bargaining, but also value the
outcomes of others (Blount, 1995; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). Breaking the equality norm is not only con-
sidered to be unfair and undesirable when one receives less than the other party; receiving more is generally considered to
be undesirable too (Blount, 1995; Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006; Loewenstein et al., 1989).
People use the equality norm as a guide in bargaining settings. A guide, not only for their own behavior, but also to
base their expectations on of what others will do. In other words, people expect their bargaining partner to adhere to
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the equality norm as well (Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006). For this reason, violating the equality norm does not only lead
to perceptions of unfairness but also to a decrease in trust (Desmet, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2011). Trust is deﬁned as ‘‘a
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or
behavior of another (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). Based on this deﬁnition, it follows that trust can
be violated after deviation from the equality norm because this deviation violates the positive expectations of the victim
that the other party will act in line with the equality rule. Research indeed suggest that people are aversive towards
such an equality violation as people have been shown to make costly choices in order not to violate fairness norms
(Dana et al., 2006).
After a trust violation, perpetrators can feel motivated to reconcile with the victim. Reconciliation can be valuable to the
perpetrator because successful reconciliation leads to a continuation of a cooperative relationship with the victim. Despite
the importance of this reconciliation process, research on bargaining has devoted almost no attention to examining the after-
math of unfair offers (De Cremer, 2010). Rather, most studies have examined how trust develops or how it plays a role in
maintaining cooperation. As such, hardly any studies – at least to our knowledge – have looked at how violated trust can
be repaired. In fact ever since Elangovan and Shapiro (1998, p. 548) noted at the end of the nineties that, ‘‘research on
the violation of trust has signiﬁcantly lagged behind interest in the phenomenon of trust’’, more recent articles have artic-
ulated that despite the need to focus on this topic ‘‘surprisingly few studies have directly examined how trust may be re-
paired’’ (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006, p. 50). Because trust is considered to be one of the most essential lubricants
of our social and economic exchanges (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Kramer, 1999), it is important for research
to address the kind of actions that are required for reconciliation efforts to succeed.
One important reconciliation tool, available to the perpetrator, is an apology. Apologies address the experienced injustice
of the victim (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Exline, Deshea, & Holeman, 2007; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie,
1989). An apology is a combined statement of both and admission of wrongdoing and regret for the violation (Lazare,
2004; Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009). Apologies directly address the violated positive expectations (i.e. trust) of the victim
by implicitly promising that the transgression will not be repeated and thus suggesting that the perpetrator is worthy of
being trusted again (Kim et al., 2009).
Research outside the bargaining literature has revealed evidence that relationships can be reconciled more effectively if
an apology is given and thereby responsibility for the trust violation is acknowledged (De Cremer & Schouten, 2008; Kim,
Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004). To date, only a few published
studies have addressed whether the speciﬁc use of apologies has an effect within more economically-based exchanges such
as social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining games (see Bottom et al. (2002), De Cremer (2010) and De Cremer, Van Dijik,
and Pillutla (2010); for an interesting ﬁeld study, see Cohen, 1999). These studies did indeed reveal that apologizing for un-
fair allocations led to increased cooperation and higher future trust behavior.
What all these studies have in common is that they adopted the perspective of the victim. That is, these studies examined
whether and when apologies delivered by the perpetrator have a positive effect on the party suffering from the trust viola-
tion. This approach is a ﬁrst good step towards identifying the important value of apologies in the reconciliation process (De
Cremer et al., 2011). The most important step, however, is to examine whether or not perpetrators are willing to apologize,
and when they are most likely to do so. This perpetrator perspective is virtually lacking in the literature and particularly so in
the bargaining literature. Consequently, we know very little about whether perpetrators are actually willing to make use of
an apology when resources are allocated in unfair ways. Because reconciliation of relationships is a bi-directional issue, only
knowing whether victims desire an apology is of limited value. Therefore, we need to promote our insights into the motives
that make perpetrators apologize.
In the present paper, we adopt the perspective of the perpetrator. We study under which conditions perpetrators choose
to apologize to the victim. We examine apologizing as a behavior in the context of a modiﬁed trust game in which the second
party (the one receiving the tripled money send by party 1) violates the fairness norm of equality and thus hampers the trust
of the ﬁrst party. In predicting whether perpetrators would apologize or not, we adopt an instrumental perspective, meaning
that the choice to apologize by the perpetrator will be motivated by the likelihood that an apology will elicit its intended
effect. The effect that we assume that perpetrators strive for when apologizing is to be forgiven by the victim. We consider
this approach to be instrumental because the decision to apologize or not becomes conditional on the likelihood of whether
the victim will forgive or not.
2. Apologies: an instrumental perspective
We propose that an important reason to apologize is to restore the relationship with the victim, which usually implies
that the perpetrator will be forgiven. The desire for forgiveness has been identiﬁed as an important motive to initiate the
reconciliation process (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). After a transgression, a perpetrator may feel moral inferiority, guilt, or
shame. These feelings can lead to an intrinsic motivation to be forgiven by the victim (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Indeed,
the motive to be forgiven becomes even more important if the perpetrator wants to continue a cooperative relationship with
the victim (Bottom et al., 2002).
It is important to note, however, that while achieving reconciliation may be desirable, perpetrators also take a sub-
stantial social risk by apologizing. By apologizing, perpetrators accept blame for their actions (Kim et al., 2009). Hence,
216 J.M. Leunissen et al. / Journal of Economic Psychology 33 (2012) 215–222
Author's personal copy
perpetrators risk a host of aversive social consequences – like rejection, humiliation and punishment – that would not be
the case if they had not accepted blame by apologizing (Exline et al., 2007). An instrumental motivation perspective
therefore suggests that perpetrators will be careful to apologize and become strategic when it comes down to apologiz-
ing. That is, the decision to apologize by the perpetrator will be conditional on the likelihood that victims are willing to
forgive that perpetrator.
Based on this instrumental perspective, it thus stands to reason that perpetrators will be less willing to apologize when
the victim seems unforgiving than when the victim seems forgiving. In this case, the decision to apologize should be driven
by perceptions of the perpetrator that the victim is indeed willing to restore the relationship. This line of reasoning therefore
suggests that when the victim seems forgiving, perpetrators should reason that an apology on their behalf will be instrumen-
tal in restoring trust in the relationship. When the victim does not seem forgiving, perpetrators should perceive the delivery
of an apology to be less instrumental in achieving reconciliation. As such, expectations that an apology will restore the rela-
tionship with the victim should underlie the relationship between perceived forgiveness of the victim and apologizing
behavior of the perpetrator.
3. Perpetrator’s trust moderating the instrumental approach
Will perpetrators, however, always employ such an instrumental kind of thinking towards apologizing? We argue that
whether perpetrators will let their decision to apologize be inﬂuenced by the likelihood of whether the victim is motivated
to forgive or not, be depend on their level of dispositional trust. The extent to which people differ in dispositional trust is
directly related to how people approach interpersonal behaviors in more versus less instrumental ways. We believe there
is good reason to expect that particularly low trusters will adjust their apologetic behavior as a function of the perceived
likelihood to be forgiven.
One important reason for this hypothesis is that low trusters, in contrast to high trusters, tend to harbor less positive
impressions of others, require more reassurance before cooperating, and are less inclined to believe that cooperation will
be reciprocated (Tazelaar, Van Lange, & Ouwerkerk, 2004). High trusters are open towards others and more willing to
take initial risks. High trusters tend to harbor benign impressions of others, tend to display more immediate cooperation,
and are more likely to believe that cooperation will be reciprocated (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001; Tazelaar et al.,
2004). As such, high trusters’ will initially be more willing to give the beneﬁt of the doubt towards their interaction
partner and show more socially risky behavior (Stouten, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2006). Therefore, high trusters will
be more willing to take the risks associated with apologizing while low trusters are less inclined to do this. As such,
low trusters can be considered as more strategic in assessing whether an apology will be responded to favorably and
will thus apologize more easily if forgiveness is likely to be given (De Cremer, Pillutla, & Reinders Folmer, 2011; Tazelaar
et al., 2004).
To summarize, we predict that low trusters will be particularly inﬂuenced in their apologizing behavior by perceptions of
the victims’ inclination to forgive, while high trusters will be less inﬂuenced by the perceived forgiving intentions of the vic-
tim (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we predict that expectations that an apology will restore the relationship with the victim
will mediate the interactive relationship between perceived forgiveness of the victim and perpetrators’ dispositional level of
trust on apologizing behavior (Hypothesis 2).
4. The present research
To test our hypotheses in a controlled manner, we conducted an experimental lab study to investigate actual apologetic
behavior. To date, the small number of studies examining the delivery of apologies relied primarily on recall tasks or imag-
ined scenario settings (Meijer, 1998). At least to our knowledge, research has not tested actual apologetic behavior. The use of
scenarios and free recall tasks is an important ﬁrst step in understanding apologetic behavior of perpetrator. However, be-
cause behavioral intentions and actual behavior do not always correspond, it is necessary to test our predictions with respect
to actual apologetic behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977).
Therefore, in our study, we designed a novel paradigm in which participants were induced to commit a transgression
against another participant, upon which they were given the opportunity to apologize to the victim. Speciﬁcally, to make
participants commit a transgression, we modiﬁed a standard trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). The trust game
is a coordination game in which players can increase their earnings by trusting each other, at the risk of being exploited. In
this game, Player 1 starts with an initial endowment and can decide to transfer any part of his/her endowment to Player 2.
Whatever Player 1 transfers to Player 2 is tripled. Subsequently, Player 2 has to decide how much of the tripled sum he/she
wants to return to Player 1. Thus, the more Player 1 trusts Player 2 to return a fair amount, the more likely Player 1 will be to
transfer his/her endowments. We modiﬁed this game to induce unfair behavior by the participant, who was allocated to the
Player 2 position. We did this by creating uncertainty about the original endowment of Player 1; thereby licensing the par-
ticipant to keep a larger share of the endowment that Player 2 could divide (for the full experimental procedure, see
Section 5.2).
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5. Methods
5.1. Participants and design
A total of 153 participants (55 women, 98 men;M(age) = 19.82, SD(age) = 1.59) were randomly assigned to either the for-
giving or unforgiving condition.
5.2. Procedure
Participants were placed in individual cubicles in front of a computer. Participants’ dispositional trust was measured
beforehand, using the eight item interpersonal trust scale by Yamagishi (1988; a = .78)1. Participants were then asked to en-
gage in a series of tasks together with another person present in the lab. They would play the previously mentioned modiﬁed
version of the trust game. The game was presented as a task on social decision-making, and all participants were told that they
would be Player 2 in the study. Participants were told that they would be playing an investment game with another person who
was in the lab: Player 1 (all the behavior by Player 1 was preprogrammed). It was explained that Player 1 had to decide how
much of his/her endowment to transfer to the participant. Participants were clearly told that the amount that Player 1 would
send would be tripled, and that they had to decide which amount to return to Player 1. Subsequently, the task started, and par-
ticipants learned that Player 1 had transferred 10 chips of signiﬁcant monetary value, which were tripled to 30 chips. They then
had to decide how many of these 30 chips to return to Player 1.
We modiﬁed the game in such a way that participants were likely to make an unfair decision towards Player 1 (i.e., more
likely to keep more chips for themselves than to give back to Player 1). We did so by raising uncertainty over Player 1’s initial
endowment. It was explained that the initial endowment of Player 1 could be anything from 10 to 30 chips; however, the
exact endowment was unknown to the participant. Because 10 chips was the lowest endowment possible, we expected that
most participants would infer that the original endowment of Player 1 would be larger than 10 chips. To check this assump-
tion, we asked participants to estimate the initial endowment of Player 1 at this point: overall, participants thought the ori-
ginal endowment of Player 1 was 20.41 chips (SD = 5.57) large. Because participants estimated the original endowment of
Player 1 to by larger than 10 chips it meant that Player 1 had chosen not to transfer all his/her chips. From this point of view,
we expected that participants would feel justiﬁed to keep a larger share of the 30 chips.
After participants had made their decision how to divide the 30 chips, we revealed that the initial endowment of Player 1
was in fact only 10 chips. Player 1 had thus transferred his/her entire endowment. Participants who had divided the 30 chips
unequally (74%) had violated the equality rule and acted unfairly towards Player 1. Participants who had divided the chips
equally or returned more than 15 chips (26%) had not committed a transgression. After this feedback concerning the ﬁnal
division of the chips, we asked participants two questions regarding their perceptions of the fairness of the ﬁnal division
and whether participants thought they violated Player 1’s trust. For the group who had not committed a transgression
the experiment ended at this point. The majority of the participants, who did commit a transgression, proceeded to the for-
giveness manipulation.
5.3. Forgiveness manipulation
Participants who committed a transgression received a message from Player 1. In the not forgiving condition this message
was: ‘‘I have fewer chips than you! I simply do not accept this! I know that I am not the kind of person who forgives this kind
of behavior so I will not forgive you this time’’. In the forgiving condition, this message was: ‘‘I have fewer chips than you!
That is too bad. But I will give you the beneﬁt of the doubt for now. I will forgive you for now but please be cooperative in the
future’’.
Apology behavior was assessed after this message. Participants were given the choice between twomessages to send back
to Player 1:‘‘I want to apologize’’ or ‘‘I do not want to apologize’’.
Participants’ instrumentality perceptions were assessed using three questions (all on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = not
at all to 7 = very much so): (1) To what extent do you think an apology is important for Player 1? (2) How effective do you
think an apology will be to restore your relationship with Player 1? (3) To what extent do you think an apology will repair
the damaged trust between you and Player 1? These items were combined into an average instrumentality perceptions score
(a = .85).
We used three items to check our forgiveness manipulation (7-point scale, ranging from 1 = not at all, 7 = very much so):
(1) Do you think that Player 1 is somebody who easily forgives? (2). Do you think Player 1 is somebody who does not easily
forgive? (Recoded), and (3). Do you think Player 1 is forgiving? These items were combined into an average forgiveness score
(a = .95).
1 The mean level of dispositional trust did not differ signiﬁcantly between the participants that committed a transgression (M = 3.92, SD = .93), and the
participants that did not commit a transgression (M = 4.02, SD = .85, t(151) .62, p = .54).
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6. Results
6.1. Perceptions of initial endowment size and endowments returned
To check whether participants indeed overestimated Player 1’s initial endowment, we asked participants howmany chips
they thought Player 1 had originally been endowed with. Overall, participants thought the original endowment of Player 1
was 20.41 chips large (SD = 5.57). Participants who committed the transgression thought the original endowment was sig-
niﬁcantly larger (M = 21.63, SD = 5.00) than participants who did not committed the transgression (M = 16.95, SD = 5.73;
t(151) = 4.89, p < .001). In line with these perceptions, participants who transgressed returned less chips (M = 7.88,
SD = 3.62) than participants who did not transgress (M = 16.55, SD = 3.31; t(151) = 13.31, p < .001).
6.2. Perceptions of fairness and violated trust
We modiﬁed our trust game in such a way that our participants would commit a transgression. To check whether par-
ticipants indeed perceived the ﬁnal division as unfair and as violating trust they were required to respond to three questions.
First we asked them ‘‘To what extent do you think the ﬁnal division is fair?’’ (1 = not at all, 7 = completely). A t-test showed that
participants who committed the transgression considered the ﬁnal division to be less fair (M = 2.73, SD = 1.40) than partic-
ipants who did not committed a transgression (M = 6.00, SD = 1.80, t(151) = 11.749, p < .001). Moreover, a 95% conﬁdence
interval of the mean fairness perceptions of the participants who committed a transgression showed the mean was signif-
icantly lower than the scale mean (95% C.I.: 2.47–2.99), providing further support that participants who committed the
transgression considered the ﬁnal division to be unfair.
In order to check whether participants regarded the unfair offer as a trust violation we asked them: ‘‘To what extent do you
think you violated Player 1’s trust?’’ (1 = not at all, 7 = completely). Again, participants who committed the transgression
thought they violated Player 1’s trust signiﬁcantly more (M = 5.41, SD = 1.22) than participants who did not committed a
transgression (M = 2.10, SD = 1.69, t(151) = 13.27, p < .001). A 95% C.I. showed that the mean perception of the trust violation
was signiﬁcantly higher than the scale mean (95% C.I. 5.18–5.64), providing evidence that the participants who committed
the transgression indeed perceived the unfair division to be a trust violation.
Finally, we checked the extent to which participants thought that Player 1 still trusted them ‘‘To what extent do you think
Player 1 still trusts you?’’ (1 = not at all, 7 = completely). Again, participants who committed the transgression thought Player
1 trusted them less (M = 3.08, SD = 1.50) than participants who did not commit the transgression (M = 6.15, SD = 1.17,
t(151) = 11.77, p < .001). A 95% Conﬁdence Interval of the mean trust perception of the participants who committed the
transgression again showed that these participants thought that Player 1 was distrustful towards them (95% C.I.: 2.80–3.36).
6.3. Forgiveness manipulation check
A linear regression analysis on our manipulation check scale with the forgiveness manipulation and trust as independent
variables revealed a main effect of forgiveness (b = .85, t = 16.72, p < .001). No other effects reached signiﬁcance. Participants
indeed perceived Player 1 to be more forgiving in the forgiving condition (M = 5.57, SD = .79) than in the unforgiving condi-
tion (M = 2.40, SD = 1.20).
6.4. Apologetic behavior
Because our main dependent variable was categorical in nature (either apologize or not apologize) we used logistic
regression to test our hypotheses. Logistic regression uses odds to test whether a speciﬁc response is signiﬁcantly more likely
than chance to be picked by participants. If an odd is signiﬁcantly higher than 1, this means (within the context of this exper-
iment) that it is signiﬁcantly more likely that an apology is given instead of no apology. If an odd is signiﬁcantly smaller than
Table 1
Odds and odds ratio’s of an apology per condition.
Forgiveness manipulation Trust Odds ratio for trust within each forgiveness
condition
Low trust (1 SD) High trust (+1 SD)
Forgiving Odds: 25.918** Odds: 3.797** 6.826*
(Prob: 96%) (Prob: 79%)
Not forgiving Odds: .982 Odds: 1.566 0.627
(Prob: 50%) (Prob: 61%)
Odds ratios for forgiveness within low and high
trust
26.393** 2.425
Note: Proportions that an apology will be given.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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1, it means that no apology is signiﬁcantly more likely to be given than an apology. When an odd does not differ signiﬁcantly
from 1, it means that it is equally likely that either an apology or no apology is given (i.e. there is no pattern). Because pro-
portions have more intuitive appeal than odds, we present, together with the odds, the proportions of apologies given in each
condition. Although these proportions give the same information as the odds, we believe it helps in interpreting the results.
For our simple effects tests, we followed procedures as outlined by Jaccard (2001). Simple effects are tested by means of
odds ratios. An odds ratio is the ratio between two odds from two different cells (i.e. conditions). If the odds ratio is signif-
icantly larger or smaller than 1, this means that the odds from those two cells differ signiﬁcantly from each other.
We conducted a stepwise logistical regression with the forgiveness manipulation as a categorical independent variable
and trust as a continuous independent variable. The analysis with the main effects of the forgiveness manipulation and trust
in step 1 revealed, ﬁrst of all, a signiﬁcant main effect of the forgiveness manipulation (B = 1.74, Wald = 12.79, p < .001) but
no main effect of trust (B = .17, Wald = .53, p = .23). In step 2 the main effect of forgiveness remained signiﬁcant (B = 2.08,
Wald = 12.34, p < .001), as was the main effect of trust (B = 1.43, Wald = 3.43, p = .03), but more importantly and in line
with Hypothesis 1, the interaction between forgiveness and trust was signiﬁcant (B = 1.19, Wald = 4.46, p = .04; see Table 1).
We compared the forgiveness conditions between high trusters (+1 SD) and low trusters (1 SD). Low trusters were more
sensitive to the forgiving communication as they were signiﬁcantly more likely to apologize when the victim seemed forgiv-
ing (proportion of .96) rather than unforgiving (proportion of .5; B = 3.27, Wald = 11.16, p = .001; odds ratio = 26.393). High
trusters did not differ in their apologetic behavior when the victim seemed forgiving (proportion of .79) or unforgiving (pro-
portion of .61; B = .87, Wald = 2.06, p = .15; odds ratio = 2.425). The results further showed that when the victim did not seem
forgiving, trust had no signiﬁcant impact on apologetic behavior (B = .23, Wald = .59, p = .44; odds ratio = 0.627). When the
victim seemed forgiving, low trusters were signiﬁcantly more likely than high trusters to apologize (B = .96, Wald = 4.04,
p = .04; odds ratio = 6.826).
6.5. Instrumentality of an apology
A regression analysis revealed signiﬁcant main effects of the forgiveness manipulation (b = .40, t = 4.72, p < .001) and of
trust (b = .17, t = 1.96, p = .03 (one-sided)) on the perceived instrumentality of an apology. Importantly, we also found the
predicted interaction between perceived forgiveness and trust on perceived instrumentality of the apology (b = .15,
t = 1.77, p = .03 (one-sided)). A simple slopes analysis showed that trust was a signiﬁcant predictor when the victim seemed
forgiving (b = .32, t = 2.88, p = .005) but not signiﬁcant when the victim did not seem forgiving (b = .02, t = .12, p = .90).
6.6. Mediation analysis
To test our second hypothesis, we examined whether perceived instrumentality of an apology mediated the interactive
relationship between trust and perceived forgiveness on apologies. Speciﬁcally, we expected that perceived instrumentality
would mediate the effect of forgiveness information on apologies, but only for those low in trust and not for those high in
trust. A bootstrap procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) which tested the simple indirect effect of perceived forgiveness on
apologies through perceived instrumentality showed a signiﬁcant indirect effect for low (1 SD) trusters (b = .93, SE = .30,
95% C.I. 1.44 to .50) while no signiﬁcant indirect effect was present for high (+1 SD) trusters (b = .41, SE = .27, 95%
C.I. .87 to .02). This result shows that instrumentality perceptions explained the decision of low trusters to apologize as
a function of the likelihood that the victim will forgive, whereas this was not the case for high trusters.
7. Discussion
Dividing valuable resources in an unfair manner can lead to violated trust between the parties involved, which makes
future interactions less productive and pleasant. Because unfair allocations easily arise, it is important to understand the
mechanisms by which we can repair violated trust in such interdependent settings. Prior research has identiﬁed an apology
as an effective trust repair strategy (e.g. Bottom et al., 2002; Ohbuchi et al., 1989). However, research to date has neglected to
study whether perpetrators are also willing to actually apologize and if so, when they are most likely to do this. Our present
ﬁndings show that perpetrators use apologies in a strategic way. That is, they apologize signiﬁcantly more when the likeli-
hood that the victim will forgive is high. If the likelihood is low, perpetrators are less willing to apologize. How can these
ﬁndings be understood? One important reason may be that apologizing entails a considerable social risk. Apologies are often
regarded as an acceptance of blame for the transgression, which can give rise to a host of aversive social consequences – like
rejection, humiliation and punishment (Kim et al., 2009). This would suggest that it is important for perpetrators to deliver
apologies only when they are likely to be met with favorable consequences. One important and favorable consequence in
interdependent settings is whether the other party (the victim) will forgive. Forgiveness holds the idea that subsequent
interactions will be cooperative and will not include blame of one’s prior unfair behavior (McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang,
2003). Thus, apologizing behavior is much more likely to occur if it pays off in terms of being forgiven.
This relationship between anticipated forgiveness and apologetic behavior is further substantiated by the ﬁnding that dis-
positional trust inﬂuenced perpetrators’ sensitivity to the victim’s forgivingness. Trust entails a willingness to be vulnerable
to others, and therefore is strongly related to the extent to which people are willing to take social risks (Yamagishi & Yamag-
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ishi, 1994). Indeed, we ﬁnd that low trusters (who do not generally tend to believe people will reciprocate cooperative
behavior) are especially sensitive to the perceived forgiveness of the victim, while perceived forgiveness has less impact
on decisions to apologize among high trusters, who generally already harbor impressions of benign intent of others. These
ﬁndings therefore further suggest that perpetrators’ tendency to base decisions to apologize or not on instrumental motives
may be rooted in the desire to prevent the social risks associated with apologizing.
It is important to stress that the present ﬁndings were obtained by inducing actual transgressions and examining actual
apology behavior. This approach – to our knowledge – is the ﬁrst effort to examine actual apology behavior and transgres-
sions in a controlled bargaining setting. Looking at the actual deliverance of apologies by a perpetrator is important because
intentions to apologize may not necessarily correspond with actual apologetic behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). We thus
urge future research on apologies to examine actual deliveries of apologies as a response to actual transgressions. Our study
provides a useful tool to achieve this aim.
Our paradigm succeeded in inducing transgressions with the majority of the participants. By inducing transgressions we
needed to rely on deception. Although we are sensitive to the controversies regarding deception in experimental research
(for a discussion on the topic, consult Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001), we believe with this type of research it is inevitable to
use deception. As participants are motivated to behave in socially appropriate ways, especially when they believe they
are being watched, transgressing against another participant in a lab is something that rarely occurs naturally. To create
a situation, equal to all participants, under which participants were most likely to transgress, we relied on deception. Be-
cause none of the participants expressed any objection to our experimental procedure during the debrieﬁng, we believe
our paradigm enables researchers to create real transgressions without being too psychological distressing.
It is important to note that our instrumental hypothesis regarding apologizing includes the notion of reciprocity. As we
have mentioned earlier and as our results show, a perpetrator is more willing to apologize when it is likely that this gesture
will be reciprocated with forgiveness. A stronger form of this instrumental hypothesis could, however, also be formulated.
That is, if it is likely that you are going to be forgiven anyway, perpetrators could also think that there is no reason to apol-
ogize anymore. From an economic point of view (i.e. maximizing one’s own pay-off) it would indeed make little sense to
admit culpability by apologizing if you have already acquired the insurance of your valued good, that is, forgiveness. This
‘strong’ instrumentality hypothesis can also be considered to be in line with research on moral credentials (Monin & Miller,
2001). Research on moral credentials has shown that once people establish themselves as a moral person, they are more
likely to behave in ways that could be interpreted as immoral. If the victim is likely to forgive the perpetrator, the perpetrator
can interpret this as an afﬁrmation of his/her morality (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Our results contradict this framework, as
perpetrators decided to increase their display of moral behavior by apologizing, rather than feeling freed not to apologize (a
prediction that would be in line with the moral credentials framework). In line with our ﬁndings, research byWallace, Exline,
and Baumeister (2008) also shows that expressions of forgiveness deter future offences against the victim. Future research
should investigate the relationship between moral credentials and expressions of forgiveness in order to further our under-
standing of both the consequences of showing forgiveness and the regulation of moral behavior.
Future research might zoom in on this interesting question on when our instrumentality hypothesis would be valid and
when the strong version of the instrumentality hypothesis would apply more. One possible way of testing this may be to
include personality variables that could help us tease apart in what way these instrumentality perspectives inﬂuence peo-
ple’s apologetic behavior. Social value orientation predicts whether people approach interpersonal situations as more instru-
mental versus more social. It could very well be that proselfs deem an apology unnecessary when they interact with a
forgiving victim (i.e. they behave accordingly the strong instrumental perspective), while prosocials are more inclined to
reciprocate.
Importantly, by focusing on the perspective of perpetrators, our ﬁndings also provide a much needed extension to the
apology literature, calling previous ﬁndings into question. As noted, previous research on apologies has mainly focused
on how victims respond to apologies and thus has largely overlooked the perspective of perpetrators. As a result, hardly
any research exists examining whether perpetrators actually are willing to deliver apologies, and when they may be likely
to do so. Our ﬁndings are among the ﬁrst – at least to our knowledge – to reveal some insights into this question and thus
demonstrate the need to also consider the perspective of the perpetrator to arrive at a better understanding of the reconcil-
iation process through the use of apologies.
The present ﬁndings contain a hopeful message. Our ﬁndings suggest that expressions of forgiveness have the potential to
limit a possible downward spiral of unconstructive behaviors that can take place after a transgression. That is, when victims
take the initiative to communicate forgiveness, perpetrators are likely to reciprocate by actually apologizing and taking
responsibility for their misdeeds. Thus, an initial positive signal by the victim may elicit the kind of behavior by the perpe-
trator that is needed to start the reconciliation process. However, there is also a downside to this effect: perpetrators may
actually be less willing to apologize when it seems unlikely that apologies will be reciprocated with forgiveness. In other
words, if no positive feedback with respect to forgiveness is communicated by the victim, apologies will most likely not
be given. This ﬁnding challenges the true value of apologies as a trust repair tool. Take, for example, the situation of serious
transgressions where victims are likely to be angry, and not very motivated to forgive. Under such circumstances, victims
have the strongest need and request for apologies (Exline et al., 2007). However, given the negative reactions on behalf of
the victim, our results suggest that perpetrators will be unwilling to apologize.
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In conclusion, our ﬁndings show that apology behavior by perpetrators is driven by the forgiveness tendencies of victims,
thus pointing out the somewhat paradoxical message that the desired response of an apology by the victim actually depends
on the positive reaction (i.e. showing forgiveness) of that same victim towards the perpetrator.
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